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Economists have long neglected study of an important contractual decision, a firm’s 
choice of legal form. Enterprise form shapes the relations among a firm’s owners as well 
as many features of a firm’s interactions with the rest of the economy. Using unusual 
firm-level data on Spain 1886-1936, we estimate nested logit models of the determinants 
of enterprise form choice. In 1919, Spain introduced a new enterprise form that 
compromised between partnerships and corporations, and displaced larger partnerships 
and smaller corporations. This Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada was especially 








 Entrepreneurs creating a new multi-owner firm face a fundamental 
contracting decision: the enterprise’s legal form. In most legal regimes today, 
multi-owner firms can be corporations or partnerships, and there are variants on 
these basic structures. A firm’s enterprise form shapes owners’ liability, the firm’s 
access to public equity markets, and the rights of minority owners. The ability to 
formalize and commit to specific organizational forms enables firms to more 
readily attract outside funding and to contract with other economic agents. 
Decisions about legal form also shape the owners’ scope for contracting on cash-
flow and control rights. Economists have studied each of these issues in isolation, 
but have not considered the prior organizational choice that creates the structure 
within which these contracting problems unfold. 
This paper uses micro-data on firm formation and multinomial choice 
models to study decisions about legal form in a context that offers both rich data 
and the absence of some complicating influences: Spain in the period 1886-1936. 
The focus on a single country overcomes complications that might appear with 
another approach, such as cross-country regressions. Using micro-evidence from 
a single country allows us to abstract from potentially confounding influences 
such as differences in national banking systems or the organization of equity 
markets. Most importantly, Spain introduced an entirely new legal form in 1919. 
The Sociedad con Responsabilidad Limitada (SRL) allowed entrepreneurs to 
combine some contractual features of the corporation with the partnership’s 
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greater flexibility. Discrete-choice model allows us to ask which firms preferred 
this new form as well as conduct counter-factual exercises about what would have 
happened in the absence of the new form. 
Our econometric results support three conclusions. First, family 
connections among owners played an important role in the decision about legal 
form. Neither the limited partnership nor the SRL appealed to enterprises whose 
owners were all related. Second, counter-factual exercises show that after 1919, 
about two-third of firms organized as SRLs would have been ordinary 
partnerships in that form’s absence, and about one-third would have been 
corporations. The SRL did not play a noticeable role in the limited partnership’s 
demise. Three, and most strikingly, counter-factual calculations demonstrate that 
if the SRL had been introduced in the 1890s, few firms would have used the form. 
As Spanish politicians argued, the new enterprise form reflected a new type of 
business in the 1920s. 
Spain’s business code offered a clear, discrete set of legal forms from 
which to choose. The commercial registration system allows us to sample from 
the universe of multi-owner firms created in that period, and the notarial system 
yields a set of contracts with consistently-defined provisions. For the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and other major economies in this period as well as 
more recently, there is no source that reports the organizational form of all firms; 
official records usually pertain to corporations alone, and so miss the partnership 
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forms used by the majority of smaller and medium-sized enterprises. Thus the 
Spanish data have strengths not available from other sources.  
Recent decades have seen the introduction of new legal forms for business 
enterprises in many economies. During the 1990s, every U.S. state introduced a 
new limited-liability partnership (LLP) form. Many states have also created or 
reformed the limited-liability company (LLC), which allows owners to achieve 
many benefits of the corporation in a form suitable to a smaller enterprise.  
(Hansmann et al, 2006). Until the nineteenth century, most multi-owner firms in 
Continental Europe were partnerships, as corporations remained rare in 
comparison to the U.S. (Lamoreaux and Rosenthal 2005; Guinnane et al 2007). 
Most countries other than Britain allowed the LLP from the early nineteenth 
century, and forms similar to the LLC appeared starting in Germany in 1892.  
Development of enterprise forms remains an active interest of policymakers in 
several contexts. The European Union (E.U.) and its member states have also 
considered revision to their menu of enterprise forms. These efforts reflect a 
desire to harmonize company law across the Union. The EU discussions also 
reflect the widespread conviction that better company law could encourage 
economic growth by making it easier to form a broader range of businesses, 
including new firms.1  
                                                          
1 For recent European discussion see European Commission (2011). 
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Economists now broadly accept the idea that institutions affect economic 
performance.2  This paper advances the literature on institutions in two ways. 
First, we focus on how firms dealt with specific legal rules, in contrast to the more 
common approach of trying to link “good” or “bad” institutions to economic 
performance at the national level. Second, enterprise form is unusual among 
institutions in that the legal rules determine the options but still allow firms to 
choose among those options. Industrial organization economists study similar 
questions, such as whether a firm franchises its retail outlets, or more broadly 
whether firms are vertically integrated.3 Legal form reflects economic institutions 
in two ways: what the government allows, and what the firm choses.  
A recent literature stresses the effect of legal rules governing entry and 
their effect on growth via the creation of new firms. The World Bank’s “Doing 
Business” project views some constraints on legal form as a barrier to entry for 
new firms, and has advocated liberalizing the rules governing formation of new 
firms. Critics of the “Doing Business” project take the view that these barriers to 
                                                          
2 This literature is vast. Recent, important examples include La Porta et al (2008) 
and Acemoğlu and Robinson (2012). 
3 For a recent review of vertical integration, see Lafontaine and Slade (2007).  
Lafontaine et al (2013) focuses on franchising. 
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entry do not have the damaging implications the World Bank view implies.4 
Requiring a firm to adopt a specific legal form allows the enterprise to credibly 
signal the important features of their structure and operations to financial markets 
and customers alike.  
 
I. Law and enterprise form 
Spain’s business code owes much to French legal traditions, a trait 
common to many civil-law countries. The 1885 Spanish code allowed firms to 
organize as ordinary partnerships, as limited partnerships, or as corporations. The 
ordinary partnership required unlimited liability of its owners. In a limited 
partnership, some owners could restrict their liability to the sum they had invested, 
but could not participate in management. (The LLP introduced in the U.S. differs 
in important respects from the version found in the nineteenth century.) All 
                                                          
4 For the “Doing Business” project see Djankov et al (2002), as well as Klapper, 
Laeven, and Rajan (2006).” Arruñada (2007, 2008) argues that what “Doing 
Business” views as a barrier to entry provides legal certainty and reduces long-run 
transactions costs for firms in operation. The legal forms we study are a 
consequence of the rules Arruñada stresses. The small literature on the choice of 
enterprise form includes Abramitzky et al (2010); Nicholas (2015); Hilt and 
O’Banion (2009); and Gómez-Galvarriato and  Musacchio (2004). 
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investors in Spanish corporations had limited liability. Another important 
difference makes the partnership subject to hold-up problems. Partnerships are 
effectively at-will and so cannot lock in capital effectively; if a partner wants to 
withdraw, he can leave and take his investment with him. Corporations, on the 
other hand, are legal persons with locked-in capital. An investor who wants out of 
a corporation can only sell his shares to someone else.5 
The Spanish commercial code of 1885, which governs company formation 
to this day, departs from this tradition in one important way. Ordinarily civil-law 
countries required firms to use one of the legal forms described in the law. The 
business code, however allowed firms to modify the standard forms, so long as the 
resulting firm respected the code’s other requirements (§117, 122). Firms took 
advantage of this flexibility to adopt features of the new enterprise forms 
appearing elsewhere in Europe. The practice remained rare, however, until 1919, 
when the Ministry of Justice issued instructions to commercial registries requiring 
the recognition of the new SRL. The new form resembled a partnership in which 
owners could lock in capital and all had limited liability.  The rules governing the 
SRL relied on the 1885 code’s partnership rules and case law until 1953, when 
                                                          
5 Appendix Table A.1 provides an overview of the central features of each legal 
form for Spain and, for comparison, four large industrial economies. 
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Spain passed its first legislation governing the form.6 
 
II. Data on choices of legal form in Spain 
To enjoy the commercial code’s protection, a firm registered its formation 
and provided a summary of its articles of association to the provincial branch of 
the commercial registry. We have assembled three distinct databases from 
information based on this registry. The first source records totals of the number of 
firms organized under each legal form, along with the total capital in these firms, 
for every year 1886-1936. These reports (“Yearbooks”) provide a rare complete 
                                                          
6 Guinnane and Martínez-Rodríguez (2014) provides more detail on the 
development of Spanish company law.  Martínez-Rodríguez (2015) focuses on 
the SRL’s formalization in 1919, which reflected a bureaucratic regulation rather 
than a new statute. The episode illustrates the central role of notaries and the 
commercial registry, as Arruñada (2010, 2012) has argued. Spanish notaries (like 
civil-law notaries in general) both advise their clients and certify that contracts 
meet the law’s requirements. Like most civil-law countries, Spain allows firms to 
organize under the commercial code or the civil code. We focus on the former; 
firms organized under the civil code were generally much smaller and less 
important for economic performance 
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picture of how firms organized.7 The other two sources have firm-level data taken 
from the firm’s articles of association. The first micro-level source encodes a 
publication that reports selected information on every Spanish firm that registered  
n the years 1925, 1926, and 1927. The information available in this source, which 
we call “Firm Census,” is limited to the variables published in the original source. 
The second micro database (“Firm Sample”) comprises a random sample of 
enterprises from the archives of fifteen peninsular provincial commercial 
registries. We randomly selected, for each of these provinces, two firms formed in 
every year in the period 1886-1936. Our data reflect the firm’s initial 
characteristics as provided to the commercial registry at formation. Attributes 
such as capital stock could change over the firm’s life. Partnerships rarely 
changed hands. The individuals we consider a corporation’s “owners,” however, 
are those who signed the original articles of association. Our sources do not 
include subsequent performance measures, so we cannot, unfortunately, ask how 
legal form affected profitability or longevity.  
Figure 1 uses the Yearbooks to summarize the distribution of new firms by 
legal form along with the total registrations for all of Spain over our period. The 
majority of firms in 1886 were ordinary partnerships, with a small but stable 
fraction organized as limited partnerships. Corporations accounted for a modest 
                                                          
7 Appendix A provides additional detail and descriptive statistics. 
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share of new firms. The late nineteenth century witnessed the gradual decline of 
the ordinary partnership and the equally slow rise of the corporation. The limited 
partnership began to die out at about the time the SRL came into being, although 
our econometric analysis shows the two forms were not  close substitutes; the rise 
of the SRL reflects a growing number of new firms with little counterpart before 
1919.   
Figure 1 also reports the total number of firm registered in each year.  
Spain experienced slow growth of new firms up to World War I, then a short 
boom in new registrations that ended early in the 1920s. Spain’s wartime boom 
reflects the advantage of being neutral in a Europe at war.  
Table 1 summarizes three important dimensions of our firms.8 Measured 
by capitalization and owners, the SRLs were somewhat larger than either of the 
partnership forms, and the corporations much larger than all other forms. We 
constructed the two “family connections” variables from surnames and internal 
references (for example, “and his son...”).9 Owners who are all related preferred 
                                                          
8 Table 1 is limited to Firm Sample; Appendix Table A.2 reports analogous 
information for the other sources. 
9 Spaniards use both the father’s and mother’s (first) surname, and women do not 
change their surname at marriage. These customs make it possible to identify 
relatives with more certainty than would otherwise be the case. Consider the 
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the ordinary to the limited partnership; when the owners combined relatives and 
non-relatives, the limited partnership was more common. Table 1 also 
summarizes the practice of stating a contractual duration in a firm’s articles of 
association. This was optional, and most firms leave it open, but corporations are 
most likely to include a fixed duration in their articles, and to make it longer than 
10 years. 
We group firms into sectors using a standard industrial classification for 
Spain. For the econometric analysis we further combine these sectors into four 
groups: factories, trading enterprises, mining and infrastructure firms, and a 
(residual) miscellaneous category. (See Appendix Table A.4)  Corporations 
dominate two sectors, mining and the heterogeneous category of agriculture 
processing, utilities, and construction. Within a given sector, firms organized as 
corporations have larger total capital investments than firms organized in other 
ways. The SRL was at first most popular in two large sectors, factories and trade. 
                                                                                                                                                              
ordinary partnership “Carrasco y Viuda e Hijos de Marsal,” a firm in the Firms 
Sample database registered in Alicante in 1934 (firm number 2029). The owners 
are a widow, Adela Carrasco López and her children Ramón, Alfonso, and Adela 
Marsal Carrasco, as well as Adela’s brother Antonio Carrasco López. These 
naming practices allow us to identify those who are related through a female line. 
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The new form also appealed to a range of professional and service-related firms, 
such as the liberal professions, travel, and health services. 
 
III. Modelling firm-level decisions about legal form 
Entrepreneurs creating a multi-owner firm choose an enterprise form to 
minimize contracting problems given the characteristics of the firm and its 
owners, subject to the legal system’s constraints. We model this decision using 
multinomial discrete-choice models. We have two questions: How do the firm’s 
characteristics affect the choice of form? And how did the expansion of the menu 
of choices represented by the SRL’s introduction affect these choices? There is no 
natural ordering for the choice of legal form, so we restrict our attention to 
unordered choice models. After considering several alternatives, we rely on 
nested logit (NL) models.10   
The NL model can be derived from random-utility maximization, so the 
estimates imply, for each firm, a rank-ordering of preferences over legal forms. 
These orderings reflect a relationship between firm characteristics and what 
owners thought would best mitigate contracting problems. The NL model also 
reveals the impact of the new SRL on other enterprise forms. When Spain 
                                                          
10 Appendix B discusses alternative modelling approaches and provides robustness 
checks for our econometric models. 
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introduced the SRL, some entrepreneurs preferred that form to any of the older 
alternatives. For others, the new form was irrelevant in that they preferred some 
alternative. Our approach allows us to study what firms would have done in the 
absence of the new form, and, less formally, to examine the characteristics of 
firms forced to make a sub-optimal enterprise form choice. 
The econometric models require an assumption: that a firm’s attributes are 
all fixed when its founders decide on the legal form. We thus abstract from the 
possibility that legal form is decided as part of a negotiation over other firm 
attributes. Characteristics such as location or sector can be assumed to be 
exogenous. Concerns over possible endogeneity of regressors should focus on the 
possibility that a potential owner might hold out for limited liability or some other 
firm attribute, for example, thus implying that the participation of some owners 
was contingent on choice of enterprise form. Given our sources, there is no 
tractable solution to this endogeneity problem, so we must be cautious in 
interpreting our results as “causal.”   
We first apply the NL model to the Firms Census database because it is 
larger and allows us to study the post-SRL world in detail. We then turn to the 
Firms Sample. We define variables in the two databases identically unless 
otherwise noted.  
A brief overview will guide our discussion:  First, firms that contemplated 
long-term investments in illiquid projects would be reluctant to organize as 
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partnerships because of potential hold-up problems. On the other hand, because a 
corporation can lock in capital, this form may not protect the interests of all 
investors; minority owners may find the management and/or the majority owners 
in a corporation making decisions that reflect some private interest over that of 
maximizing the firm’s value. This problem would be most serious for 
corporations in jurisdictions with prescriptive rules for corporate organization. 
Spanish corporations enjoyed more flexibility than corporations in other 
jurisdictions, so minority oppression might not have been a serious drawback to 
using this form. An SRL’s owners could write complex rules to protect minority 
owners from oppression.  
We have two indicators for the role of concerns about untimely dissolution 
issues. First, in some sectors a firm’s physical capital can easily be liquidated, 
while in others it cannot. Thus sector serves as a proxy for concerns about this 
form of hold-up. Mining and infrastructure firms are those most engaged in 
investments of the type that would create untimely dissolution problems. Second, 
a firm’s articles of association could stipulate that it was open-ended or would last 
only for a specific period. We construct a dummy for whether the firm has a 
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stated duration, and define another variable as the interaction of that dummy with 
the number of years stated for firms that have a stipulated duration.11   
Second, enterprise size affects choice of legal form in two ways. Only the 
corporate form permits access to equity markets, which eases the task of raising 
capital for the largest enterprises. (The SRL’s equity shares could not be listed on 
exchanges.) In addition, the corporation requires formalities (such as publication 
of a balance-sheet) that entail fixed costs, and imply that smaller enterprises 
would prefer another form. We capture firm-size effects with the natural log of 
stated capital and its square. We also include a dummy for whether the firm 
started with any unpaid capital. Firms could and did have nominal capital in 
excess of what owners had paid in. Shareholders remained liable to pay in more 
capital, according to rules stipulated in the firm’s articles. The difference between 
nominal and paid-in capital also enhanced the firm’s borrowing ability, as the 
lenders knew the additional capital could be called in bankruptcy proceedings. 
Third, family ties among owners may affect the choice of legal form. If 
close kin create a firm, the limited partnership (and thus limited liability for some  
owners) may be superfluous because family members insure one another 
informally, and because each owner will want the other playing an active role in 
                                                          




running the firm. Owners who are not close relatives may prefer a form that 
allows them to restrict their liability, that is, the limited partnership. This 
partnership form does not allow such owners to participate in management but 
that again may not be a concern for certain investors. Because it relies on a 
published source that did not report this information, we do not have the 
relationship variables for the Firms Census source. For the Firms Sample database 
we use the number of owners and the family relationships to capture aspects of 
the legal-form decision that could reflect owner identity.  
Four, organizing any type of firm required costs. All new firms paid the 
notary who drafted the articles of association and incurred fees for the commercial 
registry. In addition, the government imposed taxes that depended in part on the 
firm’s total capital (Gaceta de Madrid (1916), 687-690). Tax considerations today 
are an important element of decisions about enterprise form, but that was not the 
case in Spain in our period. Extant firms faced a number of taxes that changed 
over the period we study and bear no simple relation to form. Prior to 1900, the 
relevant tax was levied on each town, and the local mayor raised the necessary 
funds from local firms. In 1900 Spain introduced a modern tax on corporations of 
certain types. Corporations classified as “industrial” paid a lower tax rate under 
this regime, providing an incentive to organized in this way.  
The choice of legal form might also reflect local considerations. Notaries 
outside the main commercial centers had less experience organizing corporations. 
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A notary inexperienced with the corporation form could impose additional 
transaction costs for entrepreneurs organizing their firm that way. (In the years 
1886 through 1936 a total of eight Spanish provinces did not see the registration 
of any corporations.) And if one reason to organize a corporation was to tap liquid 
markets for investors, either privately or by listing on the stock market, then a 
firm located outside financial centers such as Madrid or Barcelona (or places with 
smaller exchanges, such as Bilbao or Valencia) might think twice about the 
corporate form.  
 
IV. Results 
The NL model requires judgment about which alternatives are similar and 
thus belong in the same nest. Figure 2 describes our approach. We group the 
enterprise forms with limited liability for at least some owners into one nest, and 
place the ordinary partnership in its own, “degenerate” nest. Table 2 reports the 
NL estimates for the Firms Census model. (Appendix Table B.1 reports 
descriptive statistics for the estimation sub-samples.) Several alternative nesting 
structures seem plausible, but the data reject the other candidates as inconsistent 
with the random utility-maximization model that underlies NL (see below). The 
estimates are relative to the ordinary partnership. The choice of normalization 
does not affect estimated probabilities. The nesting (or “dissimilarity”) parameter 
(which we constrain to “1” for the degenerate nest) lies on the unit interval, 
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implying that the model is consistent with utility maximization. Because the 
model has several branches the individual parameters are even more difficult to 
interpret than is normally the case for nonlinear models. Wald tests reject the null 
hypothesis that any of the branches are redundant in the sense the model cannot 
distinguish that form from the ordinary partnership. We cannot, however, reject 
the null that any branch is equal to any other.12 Individual regressors do have 
substantially different effect for different forms, however.13 
The estimates imply a ranking over legal form options for each firm. We 
compare the “predicted” legal form (the highest-ranked form, according to the 
model) to the form the enterprise actually took. With more than two outcomes this 
is a demanding standard. The predictions generated by the model reported in 
Table 2 correspond to firm choices in about 58 percent of cases. This statistic 
varies considerably across enterprise forms. The model correctly predicts about 
77 percent of ordinary partnerships and 79 percent of corporations. The limited 
partnership and SRL are more difficult: the model does not predict any limited 
                                                          
12 For the individual branches, the smallest Wald χ2 is 61.64, which with 19 
degrees of freedom rejects at any confidence level.  
13 For example, the null hypothesis that the year effects are the same for the 
limited partnership the SRL the χ2 statistic is 6.89, which with 2 d.f. has a “p-
value” of .0319. 
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partnerships and only about 16 percent of SRLs. With four alternatives, it is also 
useful to examine the first and second-ranked forms. Under this more forgiving 
criterion, the model predicts 94 percent of partnerships, 83 percent of 
corporations, and 81 percent of SRLs. But the limited partnerships remain a 
problem; in fact, the model implies that for 64 percent of actual limited 
partnerships, that form was the firm’s last choice. 
 To examine how the firm’s characteristics affect the choice of legal form 
we rely on average marginal effects (AME), the mean  change in the predicted 
probability that firms select a given form when we vary one or a set of regressors. 
By construction the AMEs sum to one for all choices facing a single firm. Some 
AMEs are large, but imprecisely estimated. Starting in 1927 compared to 1925 
raises the probability of the firm choosing the SRL by .085, with a standard error 
of .0296.  This trend reflects increasing awareness of and comfort with the new 
form. Increasing the firm’s capitalization from the mean by ten percent reduces 
the probability of forming an ordinary partnership by .0989 (.0358) and increases 
the chance of a corporation by .1592 (.0565). More capital also makes the SRL 
less favored (.0602, with a standard error of .0291).14 A larger firm’s preference 
                                                          
14 Table B.2 reports AMEs for all enterprise forms. The standard errors are 
estimated by 200 bootstrap replications. The AMEs for capital account for both 
the log of capital and its square. 
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for a form that allows it to tap equity markets does not surprise. The negative 
effect for the SRL may reflect entrepreneurs’ ability to more effectively sort when 
they do not want to issue tradeable shares; the SRL allows limited liability with 
locked-in capital at a smaller scale. Comparing the infrastructure sector to trade, 
the latter increases the chance of an ordinary partnership by .11 (.0662) and 
reduces the probability of the corporation by .1239 (.1119). Infrastructure firms, 
as noted, need the corporation’s ability to lock-in capital.  
 
V. Decisions 1886-1918: the Firms Sample database 
 We now turn to two parallel models using the Firm Sample database for 
the period prior to and following the SRL’s introduction. We split the Firm 
Sample database in this way because the SRL’s introduction in 1919 enlarges the 
choice set for that year and after. We divide our fifteen sampled provinces into 
five groups of three provinces each. To account for trends over the period 1886-
1936, we use a linear spline, with the knot set at 1899, the year Spain began to see 
capital repatriated from its former colonies. The Firm Sample has information not 
available in the Firm Census. We know the number and identity of the owners 
when the firm was established, and use the indicators of family relations 
discussed above to infer relationships among owners. We enter the number of 
owners in total linearly. A first dummy variable is unity if all owners appear to be 
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related, and another is unity if only some owners appear to be related. The 
reference category is firms for which the owners appear not to be related. We 
interact these two dummies with the number of owners, allowing the connection 
between legal form and family connections to vary with firm size. 
Table 3 reports estimates for the Firm Sample model before 1919. The 
information on owner numbers and family relationships improves the model’s 
ability to distinguish between ordinary partnerships and other forms. The model 
correctly predicts 77 percent of firms overall, including 95 percent of ordinary 
partnership and about 70 percent of corporations. The limited partnership remains 
problematic, however; only eight percent of actual limited partnerships have this 
as their predicted first choice, but about 85 percent have this option as their 
predicted second choice. This is admittedly a low standard when there are only 
three options.  
The Firms Sample database has only 500 firms in the post-1919 period, 
which strains our ability to estimate 45 parameters. We report the estimates in 
Table 4. Unfortunately, only this database has the family variables in the SRL 
period, so we must accept the possible problems the small sample poses. This 
post-1919 model predicts 73 percent of partnerships, 26 percent of limited 
partnerships, 76 percent of corporations, and 57 percent of SRLs. This is a 
dramatic improvement for the limited partnership and the SRL; the family 
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composition of the owners allows the model to more accurately account for 
decisions concerning these two forms.  
Point estimates for the AMEs in the two Firms Sample models are large 
but imprecisely estimated.  We focus on the estimates for the SRL period as 
reported in Table 4. Comparing a firm with two related owners to one with two 
unrelated owners, the latter reduces the ordinary partnership’s probability by .082 
(standard error = .086) and increases the limited partnership’s probability by .077 
(standard error = .058). The effects are slightly larger comparing a three person 
firm with all related owners to one for which only two owners are related. A 
three-person firm with all related owners has a larger chance (.298; standard error 
=.181) chance of selecting the ordinary partnership and a smaller chance (.294; 
standard error = .219) chance of taking on the limited partnership. These 
“relatives” variables have little effect on either the corporation or the SRL.  
 Our results offer new insights into the role of families in firm creation.15 
In his famous discussion of families and other “F-connections,” Ben-Porath 
(1980) stresses that relatives typically pool risk, which would be one reason we 
                                                          
15  The historical literature on family ownership of firms tends to stress the 
implications of family ownership for firm performance, which is not our focus. 
Recent contributions include Colli, Fernández-Pérez and Rose (2003); Colli 
(2003); and James (2006). 
24 
 
find that family members in business together use a partnership form with 
unlimited liability. Ben-Porath also argues that family members can sustain 
exchange more efficiently than other agents because their familial ties imply a 
repeated-game context that would not be the case for individuals who could part 
company with any personal loss. Family-based businesses reduce transactions 
costs in the sense of Williamson (1979). The family-firm preference for the 
ordinary partnership over other forms may reflect the problem of contractual 
incompleteness as stressed by Grossman and Hart (1986). They argue that 
ownership amounts to an allocation of residual rights that creates distortions, but 
is a second-based solution to costly contracting. Family members may be better 
able to contend with contractual incompleteness without allocation of 
“ownership” within a firm; that is, two brothers may be better-suited to sharing 
the management of an ordinary partnership than would two unrelated individuals. 
In a limited partnership, on the other hand, the law requires control rights to rest 
with a specified group of owners, the general partners. 
The two databases differ in three ways. The Firm Census is mostly cross-
sectional, while Firm Sample spans a fifty-year period. The former comprises 
every firm registered in Spain in those three years, while the latter has two firms 
chosen randomly from each of fifteen of Spain’s provinces in every year covered. 
These differences alone might lead to at least somewhat different results. But the 
Firm Sample data also has information on the family connections among owners, 
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and these variables drive the better predictive power. Family firms strongly 
preferred the ordinary partnership form. Limited partnerships only appealed when 
the firm included some owners who were not relatives. Most importantly, the 
post-1919 Firms Sample model does a much better job of predicting the use of the 
SRL: family firms were less likely to use this form in our period, and knowing 
which firms consisted of related owners allows the model to distinguish between 
the SRL and the partnership. 
 
VI. Robustness  
 Appendix B reports several robustness checks for the models reported 
here. We briefly summarize these checks and refer the reader to the Appendix. 
First, the difference between the Firms Sample and Firms Census results raises 
the concern that the latter suffer from omitted variables bias, as the Firms Census 
database lacks the information on owner characteristics that seems so important in 
the Firms Sample model. We estimate a version of the pre-1919 Firms Sample 
model that drops the variables that rely on owner characteristics. The point 
estimates for other variables change little.  
Second, our analysis takes as given that the legal forms reported by the 
commercial registry are distinct and the object of meaningful choices by 
entrepreneurs starting a new firm. One might worry that firms cared less about 
legal form than we think. We address this concern by estimating models in which 
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the real enterprise form is replaced by a placebo. We use two different randomly-
assigned placebos. In the first, the probability of each legal form is equal. In the 
second, we assign forms randomly but respect the unconditional distribution of 
legal forms for the database in question. These models cannot distinguish the four 
alternative placebo forms at all, in contrast to the results reported in Tables 2-4. 
Finally, the NL model imposes more structure on choices than some 
alternatives, such as the multinomial probit model (MNP). Appendix B reports a 
version of the MNP model estimated using the Firms Census database. Given the 
structure of our data, the MNP model is poorly-identified. The model we report 
does not imply results much different from the NL models used in this paper, 
however.  
 
VII. If there had never been an SRL? A counter-factual   
 The logic of choice models supports a counter-factual exercise: what 
would firms have done, after 1919, had the SRL not been a possibility, but 
nothing else changed? We pose this question by looking to the next-preferred 
option for firms that organized as SRLs. The Firm Census sample has 783 SRLs. 
(The model is reported in Table 2.) We consider first the 126 firms that were 
SRLs and for which the model assigns the SRL as the first choice. Ninety-four of 
these firms would have been ordinary partnership, and 19 would have been a 
corporation. None would have chosen the limited partnership form. Most Spanish 
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entrepreneurs apparently viewed the SRL as a form of partnership with limited 
liability. A small group treated it as a close substitute for the corporation, perhaps 
valuing its ability to lock in capital and offer limited liability at a small scale.16  
 The fact that a firm organized as an SRL when available implies that the 
firm preferred that alternative to the other possible forms. Thus eliminating the 
SRL alternative implies a loss. Looking at the types of firms forced into the 
“wrong” alternatives conveys a sense of the implications of a more restrictive 
menu. In the Firms Census model, the firms that would have been ordinary 
partnerships instead of SRLs were larger than the typical partnerships, with a 
median capitalization of 52,400 pesetas compared to 30,800 pesetas for actual 
partnerships. Those that would have been corporations were much smaller than 
the typical corporation, at about 293,000 pesetas.17 The post-1919 Firms Sample 
model implies something similar. Firms that were actual SRLs but counter-factual 
partnerships had more owners than actual partnerships, and the SRLs were much 
less likely to have related owners related (2 percent versus 36 percent). If the SRL 
                                                          
16 This counter-factual only considers the SRLs ranked most-preferred by the 
model. If we instead consider the next-preferred option after the SRL for all 
SRLs, even those ranked second or third by the model, the results are similar. 




had not existed, firms would have been forced to shoehorn themselves into a form 
best suited to a different kind of enterprise.  
A final and more speculative calculation asks what firms would have 
chosen had the SRL been available in the 1890s. Using the estimates for the post-
1919 model (Table 4) and the data for the pre-1919 period leads to a sharp 
conclusion: no firm prior to 1919 would rank the SRL first, and for 60 percent of 
all firms, the SRL would have been the last choice. The counterfactual has some 
limitations: it cannot account for the possibility that some firms would not have 
organized at all, or organized with other features, had the SRL’s features not been 
available.  
The counter-factuals must take as given the characteristics of the firms 
created in this period. We cannot really know whether the SRL’s introduction 
changed the nature of firms entrepreneurs chose to create. If the SRL reduced the 
costs of organizing a multi-owner firm (at least for some enterprises) then it might 
account for an increase in the total number of multi-owner firms, a possibility 
outside our model’s structure. This limitation is another implication of the implicit 
IIA we imposed by looking only at multi-owner firms, and ignoring the single-





 Spanish company law reflected the basic ideas current in most civil-law 
countries in the nineteenth century, offering entrepreneurs a choice of ordinary or 
limited partnerships, or corporations. Most firms organized as ordinary 
partnerships, with corporations common only in particular sectors and for the 
largest enterprises. Spain enlarged  the menu of enterprise forms in 1919. The 
SRL had always been possible, given the flexibility of the Spanish commercial 
code, but few firms had been organized this way until 1919 because of concerns 
about confusion with the ordinary partnership. In 1918, the Minister of Justice 
(Roig i Bergada) attempted to introduce a specific law to govern the SRL. But his 
government fell before the project came to fruition. Instead, the authorities 
responsible for the commercial registry promulgated rules clarifying the creation 
of SRLs. Both Roig i Bergada and the 1919 regulations alluded to a pent-up 
demand for the new form, reflecting a desire to imitate the new enterprise forms 
entrepreneurs saw being used elsewhere in Europe. The immediate popularity of 
the SRL suggests that there was, in fact, a desire for firms to organize in this new 
way. The minister was right.18 
The decision to employ one legal form over another form reflected trade-
offs related to firm size, sector, the characteristics of owners, and the firm’s other 
                                                          
18 Martínez-Rodríguez (2015) details the Roig i Bergada proposal and the process 
that led to the 1919 regulations. 
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traits. A given attribute could be irrelevant along some margins and important 
along others. Most strikingly, we show for the first time that family connections 
play a particular role in the choice enterprise form. Family connections among 
firm owners alter the importance of contractual rules specified by the law. The 
ordinary partnership, to take our strongest results, appeals more to family groups 
because close relatives insure each other anyway, reducing the impact of the 
unlimited liability for all owners required for that form. Most importantly, we find 
that the SRL was a close substitute in some cases for the ordinary partnership and 
in others for the corporation. This should surprise; how could one legal form be a 
reasonable alternative to firms organizing in such different ways? The answer lies 
in the SRL’s flexibility, which made it possible to adapt the form closely to the 
needs of a firm’s organizers. Firms that would otherwise be partnerships could 
use the SRL to adapt the partnership-like structure they preferred. Firms that 
would otherwise be corporations could use the SRL to create their own preferred 
organization.  
 These results have implications beyond Spain. The choice of legal form 
transcends any particular country or period in the past two centuries. Many 
countries introduced legal forms similar to the SRL starting at the end of the 
nineteenth. Prominent examples include Germany’s Gesellschaft mit beschränkter 
Haftung (1892), the U.K’s Private Limited Company (1907), and France’s Société 
à responsabilité limitée (1925). As noted at the outset, U.S. states have recently 
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expanded the menu of organizational forms they offer to business enterprises. We 
do not expect that the introduction of a new legal form in New York State, for 
example, will mimic the patterns we find for Spain. But the new forms we see in 
recent decades share the feature of offering to smaller firms the possibility of 
organizing with limited liability without the reporting and other burdens of the 
corporation, and without sacrificing the contractual freedom of the partnership. 
The underlying issues are the same: the way heterogeneous firms select and adapt 
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FIGURE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF LEGAL FORMS FOR ALL ENTERPRISES REGISTERED IN SPAIN, 1886-1936, ALONG WITH TOTAL NUMBER 
OF FIRM REGISTRATIONS  
 
Source: Yearbooks database.  
Notes: Left axis is percentage of firms registering as a given legal form; right axis is the total number of registrations. See text for 
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FIGURE 2.  SCHEMATIC FOR NESTED-LOGIT MODEL STRUCTURES 
 






















Note: This structure underpins the nested logit (NL) models reported in the text. 
Limited Liability 
Form 




Limited Parnership Ordinary Partnership Corporation 
Legal Form 
SRL 
TABLE 1— CHARACTERISTICS OF FIRMS BY LEGAL FORM 
 
Source: Computed from the Firms Sample database. 
 
Notes: See text for explanation of periods. “Capital” is the mean, in pesetas. “Owners” 
is the mean (number of firms in parenthesis)."All relatives" is the percentage of firms 
for which all owners are related; "Some relatives" is the percent of firms for which 
some owners are related. “Percent w/ limit” refers to firms stating a limit in their 
articles of association. There was no SRL prior to 1919. 
 
 Ordinary partnerships Limited partnerships 
 1886-1898 1899-1918 1919-1936 1886-1898 1899-1918 1919-1936 
Capital 58,296 42,279 103,971 150,039 88,382 165,188 
 
Owners  2.68 2.72 2.95 3.43 3.59 3.26 
 (224) (357) (175) (56) (97) (31)  
All Relatives 26.8 24.6 32.5 8.8 16.5 13 
 
Some Relatives 12.5 12.3 10.2 35.1 20.6 29 
 
Percent w/ limit 91.9 75.3 52.5 85.9 78.3 61.3 
       
 Corporations SRL 
 1886-1898 1899-1918 1919-1936 1886-1898 1899-1918 1919-1936 
Capital 3,330,246 631,158 2,152,169   119,255 
 
Owners  7.78 8.31 6.68   3.93 
 (36) (109) (151)   (140) 
 








Percent w/ limit 69.4 58 32.7 
  
36.9 
TABLE 2—NESTED LOGIT MODEL FOR THE FIRM CENSUS DATABASE 
 
Limited 
partnership Corporation SRL 
Firm has stated duration 0.161 -2.569 -0.213 
 
(0.324) (0.507) (0.195) 
Duration in years -0.012 0.147 0.006 
 
(0.024) (0.031) (0.015) 
Any unpaid capital 1.209 3.340 1.392 
 
(0.641) (0.515) (0.438) 
Ln (capital) -0.656 -0.698 -0.278 
 
(0.118) (0.108) (0.044) 
Ln (capital) squared 0.043 0.064 0.022 
 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.004) 
Sector 
   Factory 0.165 -0.848 -0.256 
 
(0.283) (0.198) (0.153) 
Trade 0.216 -1.250 -0.289 
 
(0.304) (0.252) (0.159) 
Infrastructure 0.274 0.244 -0.013 
 
(0.372) (0.208) (0.220) 
Location 
   Catalonia 0.523 0.651 0.040 
 
(0.186) (0.153) (0.138) 
Madrid 0.524 0.492 0.376 
 
(0.257) (0.185) (0.163) 
Basque Country  -0.303 -0.556 0.605 
 
(0.284) (0.280) (0.158) 
Year firm formed 
   1926 0.121 0.0511 0.156 
 
(0.170) (0.130) (0.113) 
1927 -0.373 0.00751 0.312 
 
(0.245) (0.136) (0.122) 
 




   
Note: Standard errors  adjusted for clustering by province. See Figure 2 for nesting 
structure. There are 3,142 firms. 
 
TABLE 3–  NESTED LOGIT MODEL, FIRM SAMPLE, PRE 1919 
 
Limited partnership Corporation 
 
Est. SE Est. SE 
Any capital outstanding 0.347 (0.399) 1.608 (0.466) 
Firm has stated duration -0.040 (0.364) -1.877 (0.749) 
Duration -0.021 (0.023) 0.117 (0.048) 
Number of owners 0.400 (0.112) 0.494 (0.139) 
Year -0.495 (0.285) 0.259 (0.170) 
Year spline, 1899=0 0.025 (0.016) 0.0618 (0.025) 
     Ln (capital) 1.010 (1.013) -1.785 (0.725) 
Ln (capital) squared -0.031 (0.049) 0.102 (0.036) 
 
    Sector 
    Factory 0.044 (0.406) -1.416 (0.538) 
Trade 0.211 (0.417) -1.937 (0.639) 
Infrastructure -0.354 (0.552) -0.187 (0.430) 
     Relationships among owners 
    All owners relatives 0.407 (0.524) -0.336 (0.908) 
Some owners relatives 0.503 (0.693) -0.395 (1.018) 
Some owners relatives x no. owners -0.151 (0.171) -0.105 (0.211) 
All owners relatives x no. owners -0.438 (0.158) -0.638 (0.224) 
     Provinces 
    Group one 0.107 (0.290) 0.612 (0.421) 
Group two 0.294 (0.279) -0.290 (0.479) 
Group three -0.126 (0.277) 0.081 (0.351) 
Group four -0.181 (0.284) 0.404 (0.368) 
     Dissimilarity parameter 0.502 (0.520) 
   
Note: Province group one consists of Albacete, Murcia, and Almería; Group two, 
Barcelona, Tarragone, and Alicante; Group three, Vizcaya, Navarra, and A Coruña; 
Group four, Madrid, Cuenca, and Valladolid. The ommitted group consists of Asturias, 
Cantabria, and La Rioja. There are 884 firms. 
 
TABLE 4— NESTED LOGIT MODEL, FIRM SAMPLE, POST 1919  
 
Limited 
partnership Corporation SRL 
 
Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE 
Any capital outstanding 1.488 (0.484) 1.764 (0.683) 0.767 (0.688) 
Firm has stated duration -0.653 (0.756) -2.697 (1.526) -1.055 (0.472) 
Duration 0.059 (0.042) 0.142 (0.084) 0.040 (0.042) 
Number of owners 0.126 (0.190) 0.309 (0.232) 0.015 (0.194) 
Year -0.320 (0.554) 0.126 (0.271) -0.211 (0.282) 
Year spline, 1899=0 -0.029 (0.104) 0.053 (0.046) 0.129 (0.048) 
       Ln (capital) 0.712 (2.094) -1.305 (1.068) -0.006 (0.973) 
Ln (capital) squared -0.013 (0.093) 0.086 (0.055) 0.012 (0.050) 
       Sector 
      Factory -1.053 (0.600) -1.408 (0.670) -0.673 (0.465) 
Trade -0.277 (0.589) -1.513 (0.810) -0.737 (0.434) 
Infrastructure 0.257 (0.679) 0.005 (0.606) -0.284 (0.707) 
       Relationships among owners 
     All owners relatives 0.907 (1.944) -1.137 (0.772) -1.662 (0.844) 
Some owners relatives 1.810 (1.269) 1.155 (0.868) 0.081 (0.725) 
Some owners relatives x 
no. owners -0.315 (0.286) -0.231 (0.234) 0.066 (0.207) 
All owners relatives x 
no. owners -0.751 (0.668) -0.177 (0.228) 0.014 (0.249) 
       Provinces 
      Group one 0.649 (0.893) 0.285 (0.508) -0.742 (0.740) 
Group two -0.113 (0.458) 0.212 (0.478) -0.247 (0.335) 
Group three -0.085 (0.540) 0.0976 (0.487) 0.331 (0.387) 
Group four -0.420 (0.808) 0.337 (0.398) 0.451 (0.351) 
       
Dissimilarity parameter 0.811 (0.385)     
 
Note: See notes for Table 3. There are 500 firms. 
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Appendix A: The sources 
This appendix provides detail on the three data sets employed in the paper. 
Starting in 1886, Spain maintained an exhaustive register of the companies 
inscribed in each province’s commercial register. Our three data sets reflect the 
information provided by the firms as they enrolled.  Each new entity was assigned 
a number, which it retained for the life of the firm. The law required that changes 
in the articles of association also be registered, along with the firm’s merger, 
transformation, or dissolution. Many firms wrote a time limit into their articles of 
association, as we showed, and if the firm ceased operation when originally 
planned.1 Some owners of defunct firms had strong incentives to report the fact, 
since de-registering  freed owners of liability associated with the dead firm. But the 
law imposed no real penalty for failure to register the end of a firm’s operations, so 
if owners had no incentive to report, that fact could go un-reported.2  The “demise” 
part of the commercial registry likely suffers from severe sample-selection bias. 
We constructed the Yearbooks database from the annual official 
publication, Anuarios de la Dirección General de los Registros y del Notariado, 
which appeared under various titles during our period: Estadística del Registro 
                                                          
1 § 38 Reglamento del Registro Mercantil, 1885; §112 Reglamento del Registro 
Mercantil, 1919. 
2 Tafunell (2005), p. 715-716 discusses the completeness of these de-registrations. 
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Mercantil (1886-1898), Estadística del Registro Mercantil (1899–1909), and 
Anuario de los Registros y del Notariado. This last publication started in 1911 and 
continues to the present.  
 The Firms Census data is based on a source that unfortunately was only 
published for three years. Starting in 1927, the Special Statistics Section of the 
General Directorate of Commerce, Industry and Services published La Asociación 
Mercantil en España, a nominative list of all the companies registered by the 
Commercial Register. Apparently this publication was to be maintained 
indefinitely, but it only appeared for the years 1926, 1927, and 1928. The 
publication contains three types of information regarding commercial companies 
that (1) registered (2) dissolved and (3) modified. We focus on initial registration 
for the reasons discussed above.  
 We collected the Firms Sample data ourselves. Spain has forty-nine 
peninsular provinces in our period, and for fifteen of them we selected two firms for 
each year in the period 1886-1936.3 (Given the archive’s organization, a true 
randomization strategy was not possible; instead, we sampled the first firm to 
appear in the records for February and the first firm for July). Our fifteen provinces 
include the major commercial and industrial centers.  
Table A.2 compares the distribution of legal forms in each province as 
                                                          
3 We treat the Canary Islands as a single province throughout our period, although 
in that it was divided in two in 1927.  
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reported in the Yearbooks and as calculated from the Firms Sample source.  In most 
provinces the match between the sample and the universe is good, with the worst 
exceptions being the always-problematic limited partnership. Table A.3 is a more 
complete version of text Table 1, and shows that the other sample moments in the 
Firm Sample data match those of the other two sources tolerably well.  
Table A.4 reports the distribution of legal forms across sector in more detail 
than used in the econometric models reported in the text. Even at this level of detail, 
these sectors pertain to the firm’s product and do not necessarily indicate much 
about their operations. “Agriculture,” for example, includes firms providing inputs 
to agricultural as well as firms that process and market agricultural output. There is 
no one-to-one mapping between any legal form and any one or even two sectors. 
Corporations are used virtually everywhere, as are the partnership forms. Even in 
its first years, the SRL was used in a variety of activities.  
 
 
Table A.1: The Menu of Organizational Forms c. 1919: Industrial Countries vs. Spain 





Ordinary partnership Two or more partners, 








Limited partnership One or more general 
partners with unlimited 
liability, and one or 
more special partners 
who cannot participate 
in management but who 




UK: only after 1907 








Same as limited 
partnership, except 
special partners’ 
shares can be bought 







Yes, but reference in 
code is indirect, and it 
was not widely used.  
Corporation All members have 
limited liability and 







varied by state 
UK: 1844 without 
limited liability and 
1855–56 with limited 
liability 
US: mostly middle third 
of nineteenth century, 
varied by state 
 
General incorporation 
from 1829 Code to 
1847. General 
incorporation re-
introduced in 1869 and 







All members have 
limited liability but their 




US: 1870s–1880s for a 
few states, but 
unattractive; laws in 
1950s–1970s allowed 
close corporations to 
mimic; 1980s–1990s 
 
Legally possible after 
Business Code of 1885; 





Source: Adapted from Guinnane et al (2007), p. 59. 














Partnership partnership Corporations 
 
of firms Partnership partnership Corporations 
 
  of firms 
Albacete 69.35 19.35 11.29 
 
62 71.05 15.35 13.6 
 
228 
Alicante 71.21 18.18 10.61 
 
66 79.08 9.24 11.67 
 
1482 
Almería 68.29 21.95 9.76 
 
41 64.62 15.47 19.92 
 
472 
Barcelona 69.49 22.03 8.47 
 
59 63.99 21.9 14.12 
 
12212 
Coruña, A 56.6 28.3 15.09 
 
53 61.77 22.87 15.36 
 
586 
Cuenca 76.36 10.91 12.73 
 
55 77.38 9.52 13.1 
 
84 
Madrid 34.43 9.84 55.74 
 
61 52.95 12.07 34.98 
 
3794 
Murcia 63.64 7.27 29.09 
 
55 55.75 9.94 34.31 
 
956 
Navarra 57.14 12.7 30.16 
 
63 61.88 5.52 32.6 
 
543 
Sevilla 64.06 29.69 6.25 
 
64 66 22.15 11.85 
 
1291 
Tarragona 73.21 21.43 5.36 
 
56 63.03 27.49 9.48 
 
633 
Toledo 81.25 9.38 9.38 
 
64 80.95 6.19 12.86 
 
210 
Valladolid 80.7 14.04 5.26 
 
57 80.4 9.2 10.4 
 
500 
Vizcaya 62.9 11.29 25.81 
 
62 64.44 7.1 28.46 
 
2635 
Zaragoza 60 26.15 13.85 
 





Table A.2: Comparison of sample to population, Firms Sample (continued). 
 










Partnership partnership Corporations SRL of firms Partnership partnership Corporations SRL   of firms 
Albacete 38.89 25 22.22 13.89 36 48.04 16.67 26.47 8.82 228 
Alicante 47.22 0 25 27.78 36 58.61 5.04 18.61 17.74 1482 
Almería 34.38 3.13 56.25 6.25 32 40.52 6.9 46.55 6.03 472 
Barcelona 36.11 5.56 38.89 19.44 36 33.88 7.58 40.91 17.63 12212 
Coruña, A 27.78 5.56 8.33 58.33 36 39.75 5.74 14.75 39.75 586 
Cuenca 35.71 0 25 39.29 28 23.26 2.33 34.88 39.53 84 
Madrid 15.15 3.03 54.55 27.27 33 20.35 4.29 49.84 25.51 3794 
Murcia 27.27 18.18 45.45 9.09 22 43.36 6.64 28.76 21.24 956 
Navarra 51.52 0 21.21 27.27 33 39.62 2.94 26.42 31.03 543 
Sevilla 40.54 10.81 24.32 24.32 37 44.85 12.23 23.11 19.81 1291 
Tarragona 41.18 2.94 32.35 23.53 34 46.97 9.85 25.76 17.42 633 
Toledo 25 6.25 40.63 28.13 32 27.68 3.57 31.25 37.5 210 
Valladolid 42.42 0 21.21 36.36 33 32.34 0.5 24.88 42.29 500 
Vizcaya 16.67 8.33 27.78 47.22 36 33.71 2.82 20.46 43.01 2635 
Zaragoza 41.67 5.56 25 27.78 36 53.79 4.24 21.65 20.31 1045 
 
Source: Firms Sample database.  
Table A.3. Firm sizes by legal form 
      
         
 
Ordinary partnership Limited partnership Corporations SRL 
 
Period Capital Owners Capital Owners Capital Owners Capital Owners 
         














   
1920-1936 98,665 
(674) 
  135,959 
(305) 
  1,522,063 
(679) 
  130,842 
(519) 
  



































































  197,274 
60,000 
(189) 
  132,091 
50,000 
(781) 





Sources: as indicated. 
Notes: In Panel A, the numbers are the mean capitalization, with number of firms in parenthesis. 
In panels B and C we report the mean and median capitalization with number of firms in 
parenthesis. 
Table A.4.- Sector and the Choice of Legal Form 
Panel A: Firms Sample 
         Legal Form       
Sector Partnership 
Limited 
Partnership Corporation SRL Total 
Agriculture, Mining, 







































Finances, Media, Real 










































      
      Panel B: Firms Census      
  Legal Form 
Sector Partnership Limited 
Partnership 
Corporation SRL Total 

































































































































































































Source: as indicated. 
Notes: Figures from Firms Sample span the period 1886-1936. The first number in each cell is 




Appendix B: Model choice and robustness checks  
 This appendix presents further information and robustness checks for the 
econometric results presented in the text. Table B.1 reports means and standard 
deviations for the models reported in the text Tables 2-4. Tables B.2 reports the 
average marginal effects discussed in the text. 
 
The nested logit (NL) model 
The text presents results from nested logit (NL) models. This choice 
reflects experimentation with several different frameworks. We began with the 
multinomial logit model (MNL), which unfortunately imposes the independence 
of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) restriction. The IIA property imposes restrictions 
on substitution. This property is especially undesirable given one of the questions 
at the heart of this paper: we are interested in how the introduction of a new 
alternative changed the choices firms made.  
There are tests for IIA in the context of the MNL model. One approach 
compares the estimated coefficients in models with and without a particular 
alternative and constructs a Hausman-type test of the differences. For the MNL 
model parallel to that reported in text Table 2, this approach fails to reject the null 
hypothesis of IIA for any alternative. A second approach (the Small-Hsiao test) 
improves on the Hausman approach but relies on randomly splitting the sample 
into two groups. This makes the resulting test statistic sensitive to the random 
2 
 
allocation of observations to different sub-samples. For some seed values the test 
rejects IIA for all forms; for others, it cannot reject IIA for any enterprise form. 
Given these equivocal test results we elected to avoid the MNL model for the 
Firms Census data. IIA tests for MNL models using the Firms Sample also 
equivocal, so we rely on NL models for all results discussed in the text.  
 
Robustness check 1: Firms Census sample as an omitted variables problem 
 The Firms Census database is derived from a published source. The 
underlying source lacks some of the variables we chose to include in the database 
we created with our own archival work, so we were forced to estimate a more 
limited model for that Firms Census. As we discuss in the text, adding the 
information on the family relationships among owners improves the model’s 
ability to predict choice of legal form considerably. Since the Firms Census data 
models cannot have these regressors, this result raises the possibility that the 
estimates reported from the Firms Census data (as reported in text Table 2) suffer 
from omitted variables bias. To address this possibility we estimated a version of 
the Firms Sample model for the period after 1919, removing the regressors that 
are not in the Firms Census source. Table B.3 reports the results, and repeats the 
Firms Census results for comparison. The estimates are substantially similar. The 
single important exception concerns the capitalization effects; the number of 
owners regression in the Firms Sample source apparently picks up some of the 
3 
 
capitalization effect estimated in the Firms Census model.  
 
Robustness check 2: Placebo enterprise forms 
 One might ask whether firms actually care about which enterprise form 
they take, or at least whether our data capture the determinants of that choice. To 
address this concern we estimate and report placebo NL models using the Firms 
Census database. In each case, we randomly assign to each empirical firm to a 
legal form. We construct two kinds of placebos. The first assigns each firm to a 
legal form with equal probability. The second assigns firms to legal forms in 
proportions equal to that form’s weight in the total sample. Table B.4 reports the 
estimates. These placebo models underline the strength of the models reported in 
the text. The dissimilarity parameter estimate lies outside the unit interval for both 
placebo models; the data reject this specification. In addition, in both versions of 
the placebo model, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that all of the estimates 
are zero.1 
 
Robustness check 3: the multinomial probit model 
                                                          
1 For the equal probability model, the largest of the three χ2 statistics is 10.75, 
which with 13 degrees of freedom has a “p-value” of .63. For the second placebo 
the largest χ2 is 7.21. 
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Concerns about the IIA assumption have led researchers to develop 
discrete-choice models that imply more flexible substitution patterns. Some 
approaches require panels and thus cannot be used with our data, which have a 
single observation on each firm. We are also restricted by our lack of “alternative-
specific” variables, since we have none in our situation. An alternative-specific 
variable would be, for a transportation problem, the price of a ticket for each 
transport mode; the variable differs across choices rather than travelers. For our 
application this would require some characteristic that differs across legal forms 
but is the same for all firms of that form. There are none. 
The most natural alternative to NL is the multinomial probit (MNP) 
model. This model allows the researcher to estimate the correlations among the 
error terms, and thus avoids IIA without requiring the structure of our nested logit 
models. Keane (1992) notes, however, that if there are no alternative-specific 
regressors, the MNP model can suffer from a problem akin to multi-collinearity. 
Table B.5 is our best effort to estimate an MNP model using the Firms Census 
data and the regressors used in the model reported in Table 2. We found it 
necessary to constrain several regressors in the way Keane suggests. We also 
impose structure on our error correlations by estimating the model in a factor 
representation (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p.517).  The signs of the parameters 
we are able to estimate this way are the same as with the NL model, which offers 
reassurance that the potentially more flexible models yields similar results. But 
5 
 
this specification of the MNP model is much more restricted than we would like, 
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Table B.1.- Descriptive statistics for estimation samples 
 
Firms sample Firms Census 
     
 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Any capital pending 0.157 0.364 0.093 0.290 
Has stated duration 0.631 0.483 0.429 0.495 
Duration in years  5.988 6.587 6.010 6.248 
ln(Capital) 10.461 1.981 11.228 1.851 
ln(Capital) squared 113.357 42.860 129.496 42.445 
Factory 0.322 0.467 0.386 0.487 
Trade 0.422 0.494 0.341 0.474 
Infrastructure 0.123 0.328 0.111 0.315 
     Variables only in the Anotaciones 
    Number of owners 3.978 5.617 
  All owners related 0.193 0.395 
  Some owners related 0.186 0.389 
  All owners related*number of owners 0.584 1.424 
  Some owners related*number of owners 1.384 5.459 
  
     Year 1911.665 14.366 
  Spline; 1899=0 14.217 12.293 
  
     Albacete, Murcia, Almería 0.179 0.384 
  Barcelona, Tarragona, Alicante 0.207 0.406 
  Vizcaya, Navarra, A Coruña 0.204 0.403 
  Madrid, Cuenca, Valladolid 0.193 0.395 
  
     Variables only in the Firms Sample 
    Year is 1926   0.339 0.474 
Year is 1927   0.306 0.461 
 
  
  Catalonia   0.341 0.474 
Madrid   0.146 0.353 
Basque Country   0.193 0.394 
 
Source: Computed from the Firms Sample and Firms Census databases. 
Table B.2.- Average marginal effects (AMEs), selected regressors.  







partnership Corporation SRL 
Year from 1925 to 1927 0.0531 0.0111 0.0201 -0.0843 
 
(0.0274) (0.0219) (0.0224) (0.0296) 
Increase capital by 10 percent from mean -0.0989 -0.0001 0.1592 -0.0602 
 
(0.0358) (0.0129) (0.0565) (0.0291) 
Sector from infrastructure to trade 0.11 0.0096 -0.1239 0.0043 
 
(0.0662) (0.038) (0.1119) (0.0621) 
 







partnership Corporation SRL 
All owners related to none related (two owners) -0.0817 0.077 0.0046 NA 
 
(0.086) (0.0578) (0.0973) (NA) 
All owners related to some related (two owners) -0.1201 0.119 0.0015 NA 
 
(0.0931) (0.0886) (0.0534) (NA) 
 
 







partnership Corporation SRL 
All owners related to some related (two owners) -0.2978 0.294 0.001 0.0027 
 
(0.1811) (0.2188) (0.199) (0.1488) 
 
Source: Computed from the estimates reported in Tables 2-4, and the relevant databases. 
Table B.3: Checking for omitted variable bias, Firms Sample after 1919. 
 
Restricted  Full 
 
Limited 
partnership Corporation SRL 
Limited 
partnership Corporation SRL 
 
Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE Est. SE 
Any capital outstanding 1.646 (0.647) 2.541 (0.751) 0.495 (0.577) 1.488 (0.484) 1.764 (0.683) 0.767 (0.688) 
Firm has stated duration -0.0683 (0.983) -3.953 (1.176) -0.872 (0.438) -0.653 (0.756) -2.697 (1.526) -1.055 (0.472) 
Duration 0.0529 (0.0607) 0.226 (0.0684) 0.0335 (0.0375) 0.0593 (0.0422) 0.142 (0.0843) 0.0400 (0.0424) 
Number of owners 
      
0.126 (0.190) 0.309 (0.232) 0.0151 (0.194) 
Year -0.799 (0.676) 0.380 (0.322) -0.468 (0.334) -0.320 (0.554) 0.126 (0.271) -0.211 (0.282) 
Year spline, 1899=0 -0.113 (0.0955) -0.00732 (0.0495) 0.162 (0.0448) -0.0289 (0.104) 0.0529 (0.0458) 0.129 (0.0480) 
             Ln (capital) 2.616 (2.419) -1.927 (1.156) 0.863 (1.119) 0.712 (2.094) -1.305 (1.068) -0.00580 (0.973) 
Ln (capital) squared -0.0992 (0.106) 0.120 (0.0580) -0.0379 (0.0563) -0.0132 (0.0927) 0.0864 (0.0549) 0.0125 (0.0496) 
             Sector 
            Factory -1.312 (0.769) -2.013 (0.646) -0.483 (0.491) -1.053 (0.600) -1.408 (0.670) -0.673 (0.465) 
Trade -0.107 (0.716) -2.192 (0.752) -0.572 (0.477) -0.277 (0.589) -1.513 (0.810) -0.737 (0.434) 
Infrastructure 0.305 (0.953) 0.757 (0.649) 0.0110 (0.675) 0.257 (0.679) 0.00536 (0.606) -0.284 (0.707) 
             Relationships among owners 
            All owners related 
      
0.907 (1.944) -1.137 (0.772) -1.662 (0.844) 
Some owners related 
      
1.810 (1.269) 1.155 (0.868) 0.0807 (0.725) 
Some related x no. owners  
      
-0.315 (0.286) -0.231 (0.234) 0.0665 (0.207) 
All related x no. owners  
      
-0.751 (0.668) -0.177 (0.228) 0.0142 (0.249) 
             Provinces 
            Albacete, Murcia, Almería 1.287 (0.834) 0.346 (0.457) -1.314 (0.589) 0.649 (0.893) 0.285 (0.508) -0.742 (0.740) 
Barcelona, Tarragona, Alicante -0.265 (0.788) 0.394 (0.485) -0.394 (0.336) -0.113 (0.458) 0.212 (0.478) -0.247 (0.335) 
Vizcaya, Navarra, Coruña -0.356 (0.737) -0.364 (0.735) 0.495 (0.399) -0.0839 (0.540) 0.0976 (0.487) 0.331 (0.387) 
Madrid, Cuenca, Valladolid -0.961 (0.836) 0.0927 (0.495) 0.354 (0.357) -0.420 (0.808) 0.337 (0.398) 0.451 (0.351) 
             Dissimilarity parameter 1.019  (.502) .811 (.385)  
Source: All computation are from the Firms Sample database. There are 500 firms. 
Table B.4:Placebo models 
 
Equal Probability Respecting Distribution 
 
Limited 
partnership Corporation SRL 
Limited 
partnership Corporation SRL 
Firm has stated duration 0.0710 -0.0235 0.0204 0.164 0.159 0.154 
 
(0.251) (0.221) (0.144) (0.172) (0.137) (0.136) 
Duration in years -0.00753 -0.00119 -0.00499 -0.0177 -0.0130 -0.0105 
 
(0.0169) (0.0168) (0.0115) (0.0182) (0.0107) (0.0114) 
Any unpaid capital 0.129 0.175 0.0978 0.197 -0.102 0.0921 
 
(0.157) (0.235) (0.204) (0.431) (0.321) (0.219) 
Ln(capital) 0.242 0.243 0.240 -0.0918 0.0254 0.0299 
 
(0.195) (0.199) (0.189) (0.431) (0.167) (0.156) 
Ln(capital) squared -0.0106 -0.0105 -0.0102 0.00280 -0.00135 -0.00194 
 
(0.00905) (0.00896) (0.00762) (0.0172) (0.00792) (0.00662) 
       Sector 
      Factory 0.00657 -0.00660 -0.00742 -0.157 -0.00859 -0.00714 
 
(0.132) (0.125) (0.125) (0.348) (0.120) (0.122) 
Trade -0.0192 -0.0109 -0.0679 0.0306 0.0589 0.0939 
 
(0.141) (0.158) (0.182) (0.177) (0.125) (0.130) 
Infrastructure 0.0511 0.0584 0.0503 0.114 0.167 0.130 
 
(0.163) (0.167) (0.163) (0.216) (0.159) (0.162) 
       Location 
      Catalonia 0.0654 0.0300 0.0178 0.146 0.0496 0.0746 
 
(0.156) (0.106) (0.126) (0.208) (0.109) (0.0976) 
Madrid -0.132 -0.191 -0.153 -0.00914 0.0174 -0.0840 
 
(0.178) (0.179) (0.138) (0.168) (0.163) (0.186) 
Basque Country  -0.0228 -0.0907 -0.0493 0.152 0.0119 0.0200 
 
(0.179) (0.180) (0.125) (0.317) (0.123) (0.118) 
       Year firm formed 
      1926 -0.0593 -0.0200 -0.0406 0.0196 0.0427 0.00586 
 
(0.126) (0.128) (0.0995) (0.123) (0.103) (0.105) 
1927 0.0781 0.0749 0.0888 0.144 0.159 0.123 
 
(0.105) (0.106) (0.109) (0.126) (0.105) (0.107) 
       Dissimilarity parameter -.252 (.998) .491 (1.118) 
 
Source: In the “equal probability” model each firm as an equal choice of being assigned to one 
of the legal forms. In “respecting distribution” the firm’s probability of assignment to a legal 
form equals that probability in the data. 
Table B.5: Multinomial probit model 
 
Limited partnership Corporation SRL 
 
Est SE Est SE Est SE 
Ln(capital)  0.0 (0.0) -0.375 (0.237) 1.006 (0.553) 
Ln(capital) squared 0.0 (0.0) 0.039 (0.011) -0.043 (0.025) 
Year firm formed 
      1926 0.070 (0.124) 0.0 (0.0) 0.075 (0.080) 
1927 -0.309 (0.140) 0.0 (0.0) 0.198 (0.102) 
Constant -1.975 (0.113) -1.059 (1.304) -6.251 (3.278) 
 
Factors in error 
terms: 







     
Source: Estimated from the Firms Census database 
Note: See Appendix B discussion of identification problems in the MNP model for this case. 
Estimates reported as zero have been constrained to that value.  
